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ASSESSING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGERIAL 
REFORMS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CATALONIA 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the degree of development of managerial reforms in the 
Government of Catalonia. Results show a very different scenario than expected. 
Reforms aimed to provide public administrations with more managerial oriented 
frameworks are far from achieving embeddedness in Catalan administrations, 
particularly in areas like accountability and incentives systems.  
 
Introduction 
In the early 1980s, the management of public administration in most OECD countries 
underwent significant reform in a process termed new public management (Aucoin, 
1990; Barzelay, 2000, 1999; Hood, 1991; OECD, 2005). This public management 
reform was characterized by a rapprochement with business management methods 
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) focusing on “the ideas of contestability, user choice, 
transparency and close concentration on incentive structures” (Hood, 1991). The new 
approach was quickly introduced into public administration research agendas and has 
served as a framework for a large number of studies over the last two decades (e.g. 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997; Sprigings, 2002). Recently, however, the assumptions 
on which the restructuring of public management was based have been increasingly 
called into question. An example of this change is the revision of the new public 
management proverbs developed by Meier and O’Toole (2009). These authors question 
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the extent to which contracting out, bureaucracy declination, organizational flexibility 
and other new public management practices have led to performance improvements.  
Reforms in public administration are evident not only in formal processes, but 
also in an evolution toward a different set of values and an increase in the legitimacy of 
public servants as managers of public resources (Bresser-Pereira, 2004). There are a 
number of different proposals and approaches to developing public administration, but 
the underlying questions are always the same: How should management be understood 
in public administration? What is the role of public managers? How should public 
organizations be managed? Longo (2006) has developed the concept of “professional 
public management,” which is considered a valid framework for measuring the 
development of public administration reforms. 
The concept of Professional Public Management (PPM) refers to the 
organizational space occupied by those roles that have executive responsibilities within 
public administrations, and is aimed at differentiating politicians from public managers 
(see Longo, 2004). In recent years, the number of public managers and the degree of 
professionalization of public organizations has increased. Moreover, the role of PPM in 
political-administrative systems has been consolidated. In a context where the 
boundaries between politics and management are not always clearly drawn (Pollit and 
Bouckaert, 2000), the PPM sets out guidelines for orchestrating the processes of 
implementing policy and providing public services. 
This article takes the position that a more developed public management culture 
is needed; however, we question the degree to which such reforms are actually taking 
place in public administration. This is developed by assessing the extent to which public 
organizations in Catalonia have adopted the PPM culture. The analysis provided in this 
study should be of interest to public managers and academics concerned with public 
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administration reform. Specifically, this is of high interest to those countries where the 
boundaries between political figures and managers coming from administrative careers 
in public service are blurred, such as in Spain, France or Italy (see Barzelay and 
Gallego, 2010). 
In the present paper, we intent to develop what Barzelay and Thomson have 
acknowledged as deliberative argumentation (see Barzelay and Thompson, 2010). As 
these authors explain, “deliberative argumentation consists of several elements: careful 
observation, thick description, normative reasoning about what constitutes a good 
outcome, and evaluation, reflecting different beliefs, values, and attitudes” (2010, pp 
295). In a nutshell, then, the concept of deliberative argumentation aims researchers to 
formalize valid general advice out of specific practical evidence, such as a case study, 
that can be effectively implemented again in specific situations. In order to do so, the 
paper is organized as follows. First, we define a framework for assessing PPM, focusing 
on variables central to the study. Second, we apply the PPM framework to public 
administrations in Catalonia, at both regional and local levels. The third section presents 
the results of the study. Finally, we draw conclusions to generalize our findings and 
propose guidelines for further study. 
 
The PPM Framework 
In an attempt to frame the theoretical construct of PPM, Longo (2006) has developed a 
framework (see Figure 1) that defines important concepts and outlines links and 






Figure 1. Analytical Framework of the Institutional Development of the 

















INSTITUTIONALIZATION VARIABLES FACTORS OF INCIDENCE
 
Source: Longo, 2006. 
Figure 1 presents two major categories of institutionalization variables related to 
the demand and supply sides of PPM. The first category of variables is related to the 
configuration of an institutional domain in which PPM can be implemented and 
successfully developed. The second category of variables is related to the 
professionalized domain, which is understood as having the capacity to produce PPM to 
meet the needs of the organization. The right side of the figure shows factors that 
influence the activation and development of this second category of variables. The 
matriarchal structure of the figure is the expression of the transversal influences that 
these factors practice on the institutionalization variables. Since the unit of analysis in 
the present study is the public organization, we focus on the four variables present in the 
institutional domain, leaving aside the professionalized domain.  
 Functional Field, for strong PPM, every public organization needs to have a 
specific functional field differentiated from the political direction of the 
institution. This delimitation is best achieved when the director of the 
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organization has advanced managerial capabilities and a moderated political 
role. Thus, professional criteria should be prioritized over the historically 
valuable qualities of trust and loyalty in the recruitment of managers. 
 Discretional Sphere, it is not possible to manage an organization without being 
able to consider available options and make decisions. Therefore, the extension 
of the activity domain for public managers and an increase in the autonomy of 
management are assumed to be the two main drivers of the discretional sphere. 
PPM gives public managers the power to implement public services by allowing 
them to make decisions in central management areas, such as the development 
of organizational strategy and the management of financial and human 
resources. 
 Accountability System, by giving public managers more power, autonomy, and 
room to manoeuvre, a strong accountability system can be developed. An 
accountability system allows for the control of professional public managers 
through performance evaluations. As Gray and Hood (2007, p. 89) suggest, “the 
huge amounts of public service activity and expenditure require for effective 
governance a valid, reliable and timely method of measurement.” The core of 
public accountability should shift, therefore, from a simple assessment of the 
regularity and legality of procedures to a system that allows for the evaluation of 
managerial performance. The creation of such an accountability system need not 
be driven by the neo-Taylorist perspective, which seeks the simplicity of the 
confrontation of a goal with the result of an indicator; rather, accountability 
systems should be able to manage the complexity of implementing public policy. 
As Bardach (1998) notes, the process of measuring and evaluating results is not 
by itself the solution to all problems of accountability. Measurements of success 
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should be designed not only for post-hoc evaluation but also as an important tool 
for developing a sustained dialog about ongoing performance (Dilulio, 1994). 
 Incentives System, finally, the PPM framework also proposes that a regime of 
consequences related to performance evaluation is essential. Without this 
regime, any control system can be expected to become less effective over time. 
As Longo (2006, p. 74) states: “The performance responsibilization is coherent 
with an environment with entrepreneurial public managers, compromised with 
the improvement of the results.” A balance must be achieved between positive 
incentives (for example, higher wages) and more negative ones (linking job 
position to performance).  
This article explores the degree of development of each of the four PPM 
variables discussed here and evaluates empirical evidence about the degree of 
development of PPM in the autonomous and local administration of Catalonia. 
 
Research Methods 
Individual semi-structured interviews, as well as focus group techniques, were used to 
collect the data for this study. As part of a larger project, individual and group 
interviews were conducted with 20 experienced public managers from Catalan public 
administrations in 2008.  
 The public managers who participated in the study were chosen according to two 
main criteria. First, the research team had to consider them experts in Catalan public 
administration, due to their experience, knowledge, academic background, and role 
inside their organizations. Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006) argue that it is fundamental to 
ensure that people included in a study sample have specific knowledge, experience, or 
information about the topic studied. Second, we sought to represent the four main types 
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of public administration found in Catalonia. Thus, our sample was composed of 
managers from: 
 Direct autonomous government, managers of public organizations from the 
Generalitat de Catalunya (government of Catalonia). They operate centrally and 
are divided into different departments (health, justice, interior, etc.). 
 Indirect autonomous government, managers of public organizations from the 
Generalitat de Catalunya who have some decentralized autonomy (autonomous 
entities, public companies, public entities that operate under private law, etc.). 
 Direct local government, managers from the Catalan councils who operate 
within the central administrative structure of local government. 
 Indirect local government, managers from the Catalan councils who have some 
decentralized autonomy (autonomous entities, public companies, public entities 
that operate under private law, etc.). 
Before they were included in the sample, each manager was contacted by phone, 
provided with an overview of the research project, and asked to agree to participate. 
From the final group of 20 managers, 15 were interviewed on an individual basis and 
five participated in a focus-group session, within which the four different organizational 
types were represented.  
A focus group allows researchers to collect information that emerges from group 
interactions; the researcher acts as a guide to ensure that the discussion remains focused 
on the research topic (Fern, 2001; Frey and Fontana, 1991; Morgan, 1993, 1996). In this 
study, the focus group session lasted 130 minutes. We used a focus study to 
complement individual interviews for two reasons. First, some of the managers in our 
sample were willing to participate in a group session, which was especially interesting 
for us because they represented the four types of organizations under study. Second, we 
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are convinced of the value that this research technique can bring to researchers; in fact, 
some authors (see, among others, Fern, 2001; Morgan, 1993; Morgan, 1996) have 
acknowledged its value as a data-gathering instrument for social science studies. 
The 15 individual interviews had an average duration of 70 minutes. All 
interviews were recorded and later transcribed and coded by the researchers. We also 
considered the researchers’ notes taken during each session. The semi structured 




In this article we explore perceptions among Catalan public managers about the 
existence of an institutional space in which PPM can exist and be developed. We will 
present the results of the individual interviews and the focus group in two parts, 
according to the two main objectives of the research. The first related to the 
implementation of the four variables associated with the institutional domain of PPM, 
and their degree of development in autonomous and local Catalan administrations. The 
second was to assess the perceptions of public managers about the domain (regional or 
local) and the functional schemes (direct or decentralized) in which PPM has been 
successfully implemented, and in which the four institutional variables take on desirable 
values. 
 
PPM development according to the conceptual variable of institutionalization 
When looking at how public managers perceive the degree of PPM development in their 
organizations, the managers in our sample agreed that overall the degree was still 
insufficient and unsatisfactory. Moreover, when the values of the four variables were 
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requested, the functional field and discretional sphere were seen as being more 
developed; the lowest levels were given to the accountability and incentives systems. 
Thus, from the perspective of the public managers interviewed, it can be extrapolated 
that Catalan public organizations have not yet developed effective accountability and 
incentive systems. Public managers operate without a framework that rewards success 
and penalizes failure. 
The managers interviewed had forceful opinions about the accountability system: 
“We have an endemic accountability problem,” said one manager who emphasized that 
this subject has not yet been developed in Catalan public administrations. “It is a 
disaster,” claimed another director, explaining that the poor accountability system is a 
consequence of the lack of a culture of organizational and managerial evaluation. 
Another interviewee recognized that some isolated initiatives have been carried on in 
order to promote better control, but said, “We have an accountability system that is 
misleading – a front for the enormous deficiencies that really exist” that hides enormous 
deficiencies in this field. “No one has evaluated me ever,” said one public manager. 
It is worth noting that some managers blame themselves for the lack of 
accountability. They argue that managers have the responsibility to define their 
objectives, accomplishment indicators and expected results. Without responsible 
managers who acknowledge their own role in the game, it is very difficult to develop 
accountability measures, as some of the managers interviewed pointed out. 
None of the interviewees denied the importance of having more developed 
accountability systems. Those who were more critical explained that failures to develop 
effective accountability systems resulted from the technical difficulty of designing an 
effective scheme of performance and evaluation measures; from “evil effects,” such as 
discouragement among employees with managerial responsibilities or the political 
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variability that affects strategic objectives; and from the size of their organizations and 
the very nature of the public services they offer. 
There was agreement among public managers that there is a lack of rigorous 
accountability schemes for public managers, but that there are mechanisms for 
evaluating public policy objectives. The managers claimed, therefore, that systems 
should be developed to link those objectives to managerial performance. On the other 
hand, one manager said that much work still needed to be done in evaluating public 
policies: “I do not see any unity between the evaluation of policies and the 
professionalization of public management.”  
One manager stated: “If there are no objectives, there cannot be an incentives 
system.” He stressed that the two questions must be related and that, even if it is true 
that the law foresees a “productivity complement,” it is also true is that “there is not a 
culture of objectives and evaluation.” 
There is a lack of agreement on the convenience of establishing formulas that 
acknowledge a manager’s achievements. For example, one manager said, “It is not easy 
(and I am not sure that it has to be done) to establish a variable payment linked to 
accomplishment. This can be done in the private sector, but it is more complicated in 
the public sector … We must have incentives. However, this point has to be carefully 
analyzed because of the lack of a well-developed evaluation system. What’s more, 
perverse effects could be generated.” 
Among the more optimistic respondents, one manager declared that there are some 
informal incentives (the chance to attend conferences and attain masters’ degrees, for 
example), but they are not regulated, nor provided systematically. A participant in the 
focus group argued, “I do not know any incentive system. If it is not formalized, then it 
is not a system (by definition).” 
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The functional field and the discretional sphere were rated more positively, but 
different opinions held. Public managers pointed out that their organizations contain 
several positions for which managerial techniques are fundamental. These positions 
require a director with a more managerial than political profile. Such positions are 
appointed directly by politicians and not by formal selection mechanisms that ensure the 
competitiveness of the process. In one of the interviews, it was said that the political 
affiliation of candidates and their relationship with the party counted for too much in the 
selection process for directors. This interviewee added that the situation was due to a 
“political culture” that has existed in Catalonia and more generally throughout Spain 
since the Spanish transition. However, some public managers stated that there had been 
a shift away from the importance of political loyalty to another kind of loyalty more in 
line with professional needs. Professional loyalty complements political affinity while 
also valuing managerial capacity. 
Regarding the discretional sphere, significant divergence in opinions was found. 
Some public managers claimed that the discretional sphere—the autonomy or the 
capacity to make decisions—does not exist. In fact, one of them categorized it as a “real 
drama” meaning that this sphere was not developed at all although it was highly needed. 
However, there is also another side that acknowledges that public managers have a high 
degree of managerial freedom, not only when defining strategic objectives and 
accomplishment indicators but also on the operational side, where budgets and human 
resources are concerned, “even if this is always framed by our legal framework,” as one 
of manager put it. 
At one extreme, one interviewee claimed that managers were trapped by the 
strictness of human resources management and the absence of a strategic vision by the 
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institutions’ political leadership. Similarly, another summarized his opinion as: “In this 
area, managers just sign contracts and pay salaries.” 
At the other extreme, some think that the inflexibility that is sometimes present in 
managerial actions can be overcome by “seeking the limits of the law” to emphasize 
that managerial actions sometimes push the boundary of legal activities. “Here what you 
propose is what it gets done,” said another, going on to explain that managers are 
responsible for “bringing the projects to the table,” considering all the political 
intentions that affect them. Another respondent said that the manager is always exposed 
to political influence or interference. “Many times the manager hides himself behind the 
rigidity of human resources policy in order to avoid managing, and this is precisely the 
challenge for managerial actions,” he concluded. 
“Managers can influence the definition of the strategic objectives of their 
organizations,” stated one public manager, adding: “It is logical that political 
interference appears in the manager’s tasks. This is not the problem. The problem is the 
degree of politicization or the level of interference that we must have. Ten percent is 
acceptable. Or perhaps managers do not take on roles that require political competence? 
This is often the case.” 
 
PPM development according to the administration domain 
According to the viewpoints of the managers sampled the degree of PPM development 
perceived by managers working in local administrations (direct local government) is 
higher than that of managers working in autonomous administration (direct autonomous 
government). In addition, the average degree of PPM development for directors of 
decentralized organizations in the local sphere (indirect local government) is higher than 
that of their counterparts working in indirect autonomous government. 
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When managers where asked if they believe that local administration had higher 
levels of PPM development than autonomous administration, half the sample answered 
that they “completely agreed” with this statement, 30% answered that they partially 
supported the statement and the last 20% did not agree with it.  
Among those who agree with the hypothesis that local public organizations have 
more developed PPM than autonomous public organizations, there is also agreement 
about the reasons. In councils, public managers must have a well-developed 
professional profile and a significant degree of managerial freedom to be able to deal 
successfully with the everyday demands of the population, since these tasks are very 
close to local public managers: they must therefore pay more attention to their 
managerial acts. 
 The data concerning managers in intermediate positions show that they partly 
agree that local administrations have more developed PPM, although their opinions 
vary. Other participants also suggest that there is a lack of homogeneity among the 
Catalan councils. For instance, another manager asserted that he did not support the 
statement, mainly because “Barcelona is one thing and the rest of the Catalonian 
councils are another.” 
 Directors who did not agree with the statement suggested some interesting 
reasons why. One said that while examples of PPM could be found at local level, they 
were short-lived, lasting only for the period that the mayor promoting the initiative was 
in charge of the municipality. He also argued that these experiences had not been 
extended to the majority of councils, emphasizing a complete lack of PPM development 
in small municipalities, and stressing that they could not be compared to big ones. 
 In the same interview, this director said that in Catalonia there were “just 13 
municipalities with more than 70,000 citizens, and because of that it is not true that only 
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the municipality of Barcelona is making efforts to develop PPM.” In fact he went 
further, presuming that “even those councils that are in between 10,000 and 70,000 
citizens have made efforts to develop a more managerial oriented public 
administration.” However, he doubted their likelihood of success. 
 Another manager said that, according to his point of view, the question of the 
institutionalization of PPM in Catalonia could not be tackled without addressing the 
main problems of the Catalan and the Spanish governments: the relations between 
labour forces and administrations over reform of the public sector. Another manager 
questioned whether “it makes any sense to adopt PPM when the managerial functions of 
human resources that correspond to the traditional development of public 
administrations have not been achieved yet? Public servants, with all their features and 
privileges, as well as the labour forces, are the biggest enemies of the 
institutionalization of PPM.” 
 In favor of the opinion that the government of Catalonia has a higher degree of 
professional management, in contrast to local governments where managers are more 
exposed to political pressures, one interviewee stated: ‘in local government, managerial 
actions are more subject to the wishes of the politicians in charge of the council.’” 
Another added: “In the autonomic regions greater efforts have been made for the 
development of PPM.”  
 Managers were also questioned about the extent to which they agreed with the 
following statement: “There is a higher degree of PPM development in decentralized 
administrations than in centralized ones.” Ninety percent of our sample responded that 
they “completely agreed” with this statement. The other 10% of respondents fall into 
two groups: 5% said that they partially supported the statement, and the others 
responded that they did not agree at all with it. 
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Moreover, during the focus groups, managers elaborate on a subset of arguments 
representing some of the benefits of having PPM in decentralized administrations. We 
have summarized their thoughts as follows: 
a) To have agencies with discretional spheres that allow public managers to make 
decisions with more freedom, and fewer restrictions, than direct public 
management organizations. 
b) “To be out of the political noise span,” as one of the managers put it. 
c) To be oriented toward criteria of competitiveness and market logics. 
d) “To be the captain of a smaller boat,” as one interviewee concluded. 
One could argue that these benefits should also be applied to centralized 
administrations. However, it was noted that the public enterprise model (representing 
decentralized organizations), is not applicable to all areas of autonomous government. 
For example, the security department cannot be decentralized for obvious reasons, 
although some exceptions can be found (see Ortiz, 2010). In this sense, managers share 
the common view that public administrations must be careful not to catch “agency 
fever,” as Pollitt, et al. (2001) have warned. 
 
Conclusions 
A first insight is that two particular areas require most attention in the Catalan 
government. The first is the accountability system, an articulated procedures system 
based on performance assessment. The second is the incentives system, a constellation 
of incentives (positive and negative) that contribute to the creation of a public 
management environment that produces permanent innovation and positive outcomes. 
Thus, the first concluding remark that we suggest after our analysis is that efforts should 
be made to develop performance management frameworks based on both ex ante 
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performance measurements and ex ante performance management (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2009). 
 It has been argued that implementing these measures might lead to higher levels 
of bureaucratization in public administrations. However, it is important to distinguish 
between regulation and bureaucracy. As Hood et al. (1998) argue, the development of 
regulatory strategies is necessary for the development of public management reforms. 
However, PPM should also consider past critiques of managerial reforms within the 
public sector (for a review, see Diefenbach 2009). In this sense, we emphasise the 
second concluding remark of this article: despite the last managerial reforms that have 
shaped several public administrations, effort is still required to improve the 
management capacity of public managers. Moreover, we highlight that this effort should 
be translated in having well developed accountability and incentive systems, together 
with an adequate functional field and discretional sphere. 
 The third conclusion of this study is that, with the exception of some isolated 
cases in the local sector or in decentralized agencies, Catalonia still lacks incentives 
systems devoted to the managerial activities of its public administrations. One public 
manager we interviewed argued that a results-based culture must be implemented in 
public administrations. Incentive systems seem to be still hard to find in most public 
administrations, however, as Longo (2006) posits, they represent a fundamental 
requisite to enhance the performance of public organizations. 
  Finally, a key element of PPM is developing the capacity to distinguish between 
politics and management in public administrations (see, for example, the German 
experience, described in Adam and Behm, 2006). As Gray and Jenkins (1995) propose, 
politics and management need not be divided entirely, but boundaries can nonetheless 
be set to ensure that both logics can coexist successfully, as they must inevitably do. In 
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the line of the managerial reforms that most western public administrations are 
developing, the experience presented in this article highlights several policy 
implications for those countries where there is still not enough distinction between 
public managers and politicians. For instance, a practical example on these effects is 
provided by Gallego and Barzelay (2010) in their case study of Spain, highlighting the 
strong influences of politics in public management. Arguably, the existing politization 
of the Catalan government may act as a potential determinant of the lack of performance 
evaluations in public organizations. As our interviews have shown, most public 
managers are still recruited and evaluated based on their political loyalties; because of 
that, acting in the same line that the political party in charge becomes fundamental for 
public managers. This culture of politization, thus, represents a serious issue when 
designing a performance evaluation on public managers. Because of that, our fourth 
conclusion is that before performance evaluations or incentives can be effectively put in 
place, the culture of politicization around management positions should be curbed in 
Catalonia. 
In this sense, the framework presented can be used as a reference to evaluate the 
degree of PPM development within each country. After a first evaluation phase, 
policymakers will be then able to set policies that can enhance the institutionalization of 
the role of public managers; whether this is focused on an accountability and incentive 
system –such as in the case of the Catalan Government-, or in the functional field or the 








This paper reports work undertaken by the authors as part of MICINN Research Award 
CSO2009/11351, and AGAUR Research Award SGR1483. We would like to thank 
Rhys Andrews, Andrew Massey and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
suggestions. We also thank the research assistance of Marina Pol and Héctor Arámbula. 
 
References 
Adam, B. and Behm, C. (2006), The Use of Budget Reforms to Modernize Governance 
in German Local Government. Public Money & Management, 26, 4, pp. 217-
220. 
Aucoin, P. (1990), Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms, 
Principles, Paradoxes and Pedulums. Governance, 3, 2, pp. 115-137. 
Bardach, E. (1998), Getting Agencies to Work Together. The Practice and Theory of 
Managerial Craftmanship (Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC). 
Barzelay, M. (2000), The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy 
Dialogue (University of California Press, Berkeley). 
Barzelay, M. (1999), How to Argue about the New Public Management.International 
Public Management Journal, 2, 2, pp. 183-216. 
Barzelay, M. and Gallego, R. (2010), The Comparative Historical Analysis of Public 
Management Policy Cycles in France, Italy, and Spain: Symposium 
Introduction. Governance, 23, 2, pp. 209-223. 
Barzelay, M., & Thompson, F. (2010). Back to the Future: Making Public 
Administration a Design Science. Public Administration Review, 70, Issue 
Suplement s1, pp. 295-297. 
20 
 
Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2004), Brazil’s Quasi-Stagnation and the Growth Cum Foreign 
Savings Strategy. International Journal of Political Economy, 32, 4, pp. 76–102. 
Broadbent, J. and Laughlin, R. (2009), Performance Management Systems: A 
Conceptual Model. Management Accounting Research, 20, 4, pp. 283-295. 
Broadbent, J. and Laughlin, R. (1997), Evaluating the 'New Public Management' 
Reforms in the UK: A Constitutional Possibility? Public Administration, 75, 3, 
pp. 487-507. 
Diefenbach, T. (2009), New Public Management in Public Sector Organizations: The 
Dark Sides of Managerialistic "Enlightenment". Public Administration, 87, 4, 
pp. 892-909. 
Dilulio, J. (1994), The Promises of Performance Measurement (pp. 94-102). Working 
Paper: Brookings Institution, Center for Public Management. 
Dunleavy, P. and Hood, C. (1994), From Old Public Administration to New Public 
Management. Public Money & Management, 14, 3, pp. 9-16. 
Fern, E. F. (2001), Advanced Focus Group Research (Sage, Thousand Oaks). 
Frey, J. H. and Fontana, A. (1991), The Group Interview in Social Research. Social 
Science Journal, 28, 2, pp. 175-188. 
Gallego, R. and Barzelay, M. (2010), Public Management Policymaking in Spain: The 
Politics of Legislative Reform of Administrative Structures, 1991–1997. 
Governance, 23, 2, pp. 277-296. 
Gray, A. and Hood, C. (2007), Public Management by Numbers. Public Money & 
Management, 27, 2, pp. 89-89. 
Gray, A. and Jenkins, B. (1995), From Public Administration to Public Managment: 
Reassessing a Revolution? Public Administration, 73, 1, pp. 75-99. 
21 
 
Hesse-Bibber, S. N. and Levy, P. (2006), The Practice of Qualitative Research (Sage, 
Thousand Oaks). 
Hood, C. (1991), A Public Management for all Seasons? Public Administration, 69, 1, 
3-19. 
Hood, C., James, O., Jones, G., Scott, C. and Travers, T. (1998), Regulation Inside 
Government: Where New Public Management Meets the Audit Explosion. 
Public Money & Management, 18, 2, pp. 61-68. 
Longo, F. (2004), Mérito y Flexibilidad. (Paidós, Barcelona). 
Longo, F. (2006), Oferta y demanda de gerentes públicos. Un marco de análisis de la 
institucionalización de la dirección pública profesional. Reforma y democracia. 
Revista del CLAD, 35, pp. 63-95. 
Meier, K. J. and O'Toole, J. L. J. (2009), The Proverbs of New Public Management: 
Lessons From an Evidence-Based Research Agenda. American Review of Public 
Administration, 39, 1, pp. 4-22. 
Morgan, D. L. (1993), Successful Focus Group: Advancing the State of the Art. (Sage, 
Newbury Park). 
Morgan, D. L. (1996), Focus Group. Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 1, pp. 129-152. 
OECD. (2005), Annual Report (OECD, Paris). 
Ortiz, C. (2010), The New Public Management of Security: The Contracting and 
Managerial State and the Private Military Industry. Public Money & 
Management, 30, 1, pp. 35-41. 
Pollit, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., Smullen, A. and Talbot, C. (2001), Agency Fever? 
Analysis of an International Policy Fashion. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis: Research and Practice, 3, 3, pp. 271-290. 
22 
 
Pollit, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2000), Public Management Reform: A Comparative 
Analysis (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
Sprigings, N. (2002), Delivering Public Services Under the New Public Management: 
The Case of Public Housing. Public Money & Management, 22, 4, pp. 11-17. 
 
